



Giesecke+Devrient

**Site Security Target
Lite for
Giesecke+Devrient
Mobile Security
China Huangshi
Branch**

Version 1.6/09.05.2022

Rating : **Public**

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1. Document Information

1.1 Reference

Title of document: Site Security Target Lite for Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security China Huangshi Branch

Version/Date: Version 1.6/09.05.2022

Applying Company: Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch

Name of the site: Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch

Abbreviation of the site: GDCHINA HS

Product Type: Smart Card Production (including inlay manufacturing)

1.2 Overview

This document is the Site Security Target Lite for the site Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch. It is based on [5] with the modifications necessary to correctly describe the sites named above.

2. SST Introduction

This chapter is divided into the sections "Identification of the Site" and "Site description".

This security target refers to the following site:

Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch

The site is used for Smart Card Production (including inlay manufacturing).

2.1 Identification of the Site

The Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch is located at

Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch

151 Hangzhou West Road,

Huangshi City Hubei Province, 435000 PRC (People's Republic of China)

The production area of GDCHINA HS is located on a fenced and guarded area that is owned by Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch and is not shared with other companies.

Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch provides services for Smart Card Production and is abbreviated by 'GDCHINA HS'.

When not in production, Smart Card IC, Smart Cards and Smart Card Modules are securely stored in the main vault and sensitive materials vault. The vaults are located in the warehouse inside of the high security area at the ground floor of the building.

The server infrastructure is located in a dedicated server room. Physical Security Management, IT and the local IT administrators are located at GDCHINA HS

The supporting IT services are provided by GDM (Giesecke+Devrient München) located at a secure area with restricted access which has been audited.

2.2 Site description

The following services and/or processes provided by Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch are in the scope of the site evaluation process:

- Secure reception, storage and delivery of Smart Card modules and Smart Cards (these different types of Smart Card related products are referred to as 'Smart Cards' throughout the rest of this document). Delivery includes delivery for secure destruction.
- Secure reception and storage of initialisation data for Smart Card Production
- Secure reception and storage of cryptographic keys, derivation of card specific personalisation keys.
- Smart Card Production comprising flash loading, completion (i.e. finishing the Smart Card OS), and initialisation of contact (incl. dual interface) cards and contactless cards or modules
- Secure inlay manufacturing
- Secure destruction of Smart Card modules and Smart Cards

The site evaluation covers only the handling and production (i.e. the services/processes listed above) of STARCOS products (i.e. passports, ID cards, signature cards, German Health cards eGK, etc. based on G+D's STARCOS operating system) and Smart Cafe Expert products (i.e. passports, ID cards, signature cards, etc. based on G+D's Smart Café Expert operating system). In addition, products which require EMVCo related type approvals are produced and handled in the same environment following the same procedures as the products named above.

The term 'handling' in this regard comprises secure reception, storage and delivery of Smart Card ICs, Smart Card modules and Smart Cards as well as secure reception and storage of data for Smart Card Production.

The reception of Smart Card ICs, Smart Card modules and Smart Cards comprises a verification of the correctness of the delivered items with respect to the delivery documents and - if applicable - the verification of integrity of seals used for secure transportation of items.

The storage of Smart Card related items is done in a specially secured vaults at GDCHINA HS with restricted access. The number of items is tracked from reception of the items until the delivery of the items.

The services of secure reception, storage and delivery of Smart Card products and related items not only covers G+D's own products but also third party products, because the same processes apply for these products as for G+D's products. Therefore the site evaluation also covers these third party products.

Secure destruction of Smart Card modules (either several single modules from reel or modules formally part of a Smart Card) with a shredder and additional grinding to a maximum size of 1 mm² (DIN 66399 E-6) or the plastic card body of a Smart Card (without module) with a shredder.

2.2.1 Smart Card Production

The Smart Card Production site hosts (beside others) a secure storage area for Smart Cards as well as a secure production area for inlay manufacturing, completion, and initialisation of Smart Cards. The production site is located on a fenced and monitored area with only one entrance. The site can either be accessed by foot passing a turnstile secured by a card reader or in a vehicle. All vehicles and drivers's information are backed up in the Guard House of Security, the authorisation for entering the site in a vehicle is under the control of permanently present security staff. On site access to the security areas is restricted to authorised persons only. The access to the security areas is secured by a mantraps which can only be entered by successful authorisation by card (company badge or visitor's badge). Access rights on access cards are granted and revoked by the responsible for physical site security.

After the last production step is finished the Smart Cards are delivered either to another site which performs further production steps or to the Card Issuer or the cardholder on behalf of the Card Issuer. Not all possible production steps have to be carried out at this site. Initialisation, for example, is an optional step. A delivery of Smart Cards to a different Smart Card Production facility prior to the end of the initialisation is possible.

After delivery of Smart Cards to the Smart Card Production Site the modules, inlays or cards are either processed immediately or securely stored in the secure storage area. They are only kept outside the secure storage area for the purpose of production or delivery.

The client's data for Smart Card Production can be received in different ways according to the technical and security needs of the client.

2.2.2 Supporting Services

The location for Supporting Services is GDM in Munich, a security area with restricted access. A company badge or visitor badge has to be presented for access to this area. Access rights on access cards are granted and revoked by the responsible for physical site security. At the site for supporting services no Smart Card Software Development is performed. Therefore no configuration management system is necessary for the site GDM. The supporting services comprise Corporate Security Office, IT security and IT services, for details see [11] `Services_Used_From_Other_Sites_GDCHINA` HS.

2.2.3 Life-Cycle Phases

It is assumed that product certifications which refer to this Site Security Target are related to a TOE that follows a TOE life-cycle according to [10], chap. 1.2.3.

Giesecke+Devrient (China) Technologies Co.,Ltd. Huangshi Branch covers Phase 4 (IC Packaging) by providing inlay manufacturing and Phase 5 (Composite Product Integration) by providing the services of inlay assembly, configuration, completion and initialisation.

The site provides additional services that are out of the scope of this Site Security Target (e.g. personalisation).

3. Conformance Claim

The evaluation is based on Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5 [1], [2]. For the evaluation the methodology in [3] will be used. The SST is CC Part 3 conformant.

This Site Security Target covers the following CC assurance components:

ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2 and ALC_LCD.1.

The assurance components chosen for the Site Security Target are taken from the definition of the EAL5 package defined in [2], because this is the level usually applied in smart card chip evaluations. Since some protection profiles refer to EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 instead of ALC_DVS.1 as in the original package definition of EAL5, for this Site Security Target also ALC_DVS.2 has been selected instead of ALC_DVS.1.

Note that the site does not provide services that are covered by ALC_TAT.2. This component is rejected because development activities as those defined in PP0084 are out of scope of the certification of this site.

For the assessment of the security measures attackers with high attack potential are assumed. This allows an evaluation of products using this site according to the assurance component AVA_VAN.5.

4. Security Problem Definition

The Security Problem Definition comprises security problems derived from threats against the assets handled by the site and security problems derived from the configuration management requirements. The configuration management covers the integrity of the products and the security management of the site.

The Security Problem Definition comprises two major so called security problems. The first set of security problems comprises all kind of attacks regarding theft (e.g. samples) or disclosure (e.g. design data) or manipulation of assets. For simplification the term 'get access' covers all three before mentioned security problems. These security problems are described in terms of threats. The second set of security problems comprises the requirements for the configuration management (e.g. controlled modification) and the control of security measures. These security problems are described in terms of Organisational Security Policies (OSP).

4.1 Assets

The following section describes the assets handled at the site:

- sensitive products:
 - unfinished as cards, modules, inlays or other packages
 - finished products
 - defective or rejected products
- sensitive production systems or configuration systems
- security relevant production processes
- sensitive configuration data or items
- cryptographic keys to secure initialisation and/or personalisation

4.2 Threats

All threats endanger the integrity and confidentiality of the products and the representation of parts of the products. The products protect themselves after conclusion of the initialisation phase. However, during the development and production the products and the representation of parts of the products are vulnerable to such attacks.

Remark: The term 'sensitive configuration item' has been replaced by 'sensitive data or items', because not only the theft or modification of sensitive configuration items but also

of other data kept outside the configuration management system (e.g. cryptographic keys) might compromise the security of a product.

T.Smart-Theft: An attacker tries to access sensitive areas of the site for manipulation or theft of sensitive configuration data or items. The attacker has sufficient time to investigate the site outside the controlled boundary. For the attack the use of standard equipment for burglary is considered. In addition, the attacker may be able to use specific working clothes of the site to camouflage the intention.

T.Rugged-Theft: An experienced thief with specialised equipment for burglary, who may be paid to perform the attack tries to access sensitive areas and manipulate or steal sensitive configuration data or items.

T.Computer-Net: A hacker with substantial expertise, standard equipment, who may be paid to attempt to remotely access sensitive network segments to get access to sensitive configuration data or items or modify security relevant production processes.

T.Accident-Change: An employee, or freelancer of G+D may exchange products of different production lots or different clients during production by accident.

T.Unauthorised-Staff: Employees freelancer of G+D or non G+D employee not authorised to get access to products or systems used for production get access to sensitive configuration data or items or products or affect production systems or configuration systems, so that the confidentiality and/or the integrity of the product is violated. This can apply to completion or initialisation and any sensitive configuration data or item of the finished product as well as to the finished product, its configuration data or other sensitive data (e.g cryptographic keys).

T.Staff-Collusion: An attacker tries to get access to sensitive configuration data or items stored or processed at the site. The attacker tries to get support from one or more employees through an attempted extortion or an attempt at bribery.

T.Attack-Transport: An attacker might try to get sensitive configuration data or items, specifications or products during the internal shipment or the external delivery. The target is to compromise confidential information or violate the integrity of the products during the stated internal shipment or the external delivery process to allow a modification, cloning or the retrieval of confidential information. Confidential information comprises design data, customer or consumer data like code and data (including cryptographic keys) stored in the ROM, Flash or EEPROM or classified product specifications.

4.3 Organisational Security Policies

The following policies are introduced by the requirements of the assurance components of ALC for the assurance level EAL5+ (augmented by ALC_DVS.2). The chosen policies shall support the understanding of the production flow and the security measures of the site. In addition, they shall allow an appropriate mapping to the Security Assurance Requirements (SAR).

P.Config-Items: The configuration management system shall be able to uniquely identify sensitive configuration data or items. This includes the unique identification of sensitive configuration data or items that are created, generated, developed or used at a site as well as the received and transferred and provided sensitive configuration data or items.

P.Config-Control: The procedures for setting up the production process for a new product as well as the procedure that allows changes of the initial setup for a product shall only be applied by authorised personnel. Automated systems shall support the configuration management and ensure access control or interactive acceptance measures for set up and changes. The procedure for the initial set up of a development or production process ensures that sufficient information is provided by the client.

P.Config-Process: The services and processes provided by the site are controlled in the configuration management plan. This comprises tools used for the production of the

product, the management of flaws and optimisations of the process flow as well as the documentation that describes the services and processes provided by the site.

P.Reception-Control: The inspection of incoming sensitive configuration data or items done at the site ensures that the received sensitive configuration data or items comply with the properties stated by the client.

P.Accept-Product: If required by the client, release tests are performed to ensure the compliance with the specification of the client.

P.Zero-Balance: For each hand over of sensitive configuration data or items, either an automated or an organisational “two-employees-acknowledgement” (four-eyes principle) is applied for functional and defective products. According to the released production process the defective products are either sent back to the client or customer and/or consumer or to another Smart Card Production facility (depending on the production-setup).

P.Organise-Product: The configuration, completion or initialisation process is applied as specified by the client. Performing the initialisation is an optional production step. If the data includes sensitive items like cryptographic keys relevant for the life-cycle or sensitive configuration data that affect the security of the product, appropriate measures must be in place. This includes the requirement that the knowledge of cryptographic keys shall be split to at least two different persons. Furthermore, technical measures like crypto-boxes, separation of network, split access permission and secure storage shall be implemented for this kind of sensitive configuration data.

P.Product-Transport: Technical and organisational measures shall ensure the correct labelling of the product. A controlled internal shipment and/or the external delivery shall be applied. The transport supports traceability up to the acceptor. If applicable or required this policy shall include measures for packing if required to protect the product during transport.

In case the product is protecting itself after conclusion of a specific production step - i.e. after initialisation - no specific protection during transport might be necessary.

4.4 Assumptions

Each site operating in a production flow must rely on preconditions provided by the previous site. Each site has to rely on the information received by the previous site/client. This is reflected by the assumptions that must be defined for the interface.

The following assumptions are considered to be applicable to all sites.

A.Prod-Specification: The client must provide appropriate information in order to ensure an appropriate production process. This includes the delivery of correct data for production, secured by appropriate means against modification and/or disclosure, if necessary.

A.Prod-Release: The client is responsible for the release of the products to be produced.

A.Item-Identification: Each sensitive configuration data or item received by the site can be uniquely identified.

A.External-Delivery: The recipient (consumer) of the product is identified by the address provided by the client. The address of the consumer is part of the product setup. Alternatively, deliveries to the client (Card Issuer) or other Smart Card Production facilities are possible. Every recipient of the product is identified by the address provided by the client.

A.Internal-Shipment: The recipient (client) of the product is identified by the address of the client site for physical items and by corresponding information (e.g. email address) for electronic items.

A.Init-Data: The requirements on the scripts for the configuration and initialisation process are specified or provided by the client of the product.

A.Product-Integrity: The self-protecting features of the Smart Cards in production are fully operational and it is not possible to influence the configuration and behaviour of the devices based on insufficient operational conditions or any command sequence generated by an attacker or by accident.

A.Destruct-Scrap: In case scrap configuration items are not destroyed under the supervision of the site, scrap configuration items are transferred to another site and they are securely destroyed at the receiving site so that they are useless for an attacker.

A.Used-Services: If services provided by other G+D sites related to production and development of products which undergo Common Criteria certification are used then these sites are CC certified.¹

¹ As mentioned in sec. 2.2.2, GDCHINA HS uses services from GDM, which is part of the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0185-2021.

5. Security Objectives

The Security Objectives are related to physical, technical and organisational security measures, the configuration management as well as the internal shipment and the external delivery.

O.Security-Documentation: The security of the site is maintained according to the sites security documentation covering all physical and logical measures to ensure the security of the site.

O.Physical-Access: The combination of physical partitioning between the different access control levels together with technical and organisational security measures allows a sufficient separation of employees to enforce the “need to know” principle. The access control shall support the limitation for the access to these areas including the identification and rejection of unauthorised people. The site shall enforce two levels (level 1 and level 2) of access control to sensitive areas of the site. The access control measures ensure that only registered employees and visitors can access restricted areas. Sensitive products are handled in restricted areas only.

O.Security-Control: Assigned personnel of the site or guards operate the systems for access control and surveillance and respond to alarms. Technical security measures like video control, motion sensors and similar kind of sensors support the enforcement of the access control. These personnel are also responsible for registering and ensuring escort of visitors, contractors and suppliers.

O.Alarm-Response: The technical and organisational security measures ensure that an alarm is generated before an unauthorised person gets access to any sensitive configuration data or item. After the alarm is triggered the unauthorised person still has to overcome further security measures. The reaction time of the employees or guards is short enough to prevent a successful attack.

O.Internal-Monitor: The site performs security management meetings on a regular basis. The security management meetings are used to review security incidences, to verify that maintenance measures are applied and to reconsider the assessment of risks and security measures. Furthermore, an internal audit is performed at least every year to verify the application of the security measures. Sensitive processes may be controlled within a shorter time frame to ensure a sufficient protection.

O.Maintain-Security: Technical security measures are maintained regularly to ensure correct operation. The logging of sensitive systems is checked regularly. This comprises the access control system to ensure that only authorised employees have access to sensitive areas as well as computer/network systems to ensure that they are configured as required to ensure the protection of the networks and computer systems.

O.Logical-Access: The site enforces a logical separation between the internal network and the internet by a firewall. The firewall ensures that only defined services and defined connections are accepted. Furthermore, the internal network is separated into a production network and an office network. Additional specific networks for production and configuration are physically or logically separated from any internal network to enforce access control. Access to the production network and related systems is restricted to authorised employees that work in the related area or that are involved in the configuration tasks or the production systems. Every user of an IT system has its own user account and password. All computer systems with access to sensitive data require successful authentication either by user name and password or identification token (e.g. company badge) and password.

O.Logical-Operation: All network segments and the computer systems are kept up-to-date (software updates, security patches, virus protection). The backup of sensitive data and security relevant logs is applied according to the classification of the stored data.

O.Config-Items: The site has a configuration management system that assigns a unique internal identification to each product to uniquely identify products.

O.Config-Control: The site applies a released procedure for the setup of the production process for each new product. In addition, the site has a process to classify and introduce changes for services and/or processes of released products. A designated team is responsible for integration of new products into the configuration management system.

O.Config-Process: The site controls its services and/or processes using a configuration management plan. The configuration management is supported by tools and procedures for the production of the product, for the management of flaws and optimisations of the process flow as well as for the documentation that describes the services and/or processes provided by the site.

O.Accept-Product: Upon request of the client, release tests are performed to ensure the compliance with the specification of the client.

O.Organise-Product: For the configuration, completion or initialisation process it is ensured that the specified process is applied. Performing the initialisation is an optional production step. The data integrity is either ensured by technical means, cryptographic means or is verified at the site. Security relevant cryptographic keys can only be constructed in plaintext or used for cryptographic operations by at least two employees. Other sensitive data can only be constructed in plaintext by at least two employees. Use of security relevant cryptographic keys is restricted to crypto-boxes (e.g. Hardware Security Modules, HSM) or similar devices (e.g. smartcards). The update of already released products is done according to a controlled process.

O.Staff-Engagement: All employees who have access to sensitive configuration data or items and who can move parts of the product out of the defined production flow are checked regarding security concerns and have to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Furthermore, all employees are trained and qualified for their job.

O.Zero-Balance: Automated control and/or two employees acknowledgement during hand over of sensitive items is applied for functional and defective products. According to the agreed production flow the defect products are either destroyed at the site or sent to the client or the consumer.

O.Reception-Control: Upon reception of a physical product an incoming inspection is performed. The inspection comprises the received amount of products and the identification according to the documentation of the supplier. For electronic items that require authenticity, the authenticity is verified upon reception.

O.Internal-Shipment: The recipient of a physical configuration item is identified by the assigned client address. The recipient(s) of an electronic configuration item (e.g. source code) can be identified in different ways. The specific way is defined in the internal shipment procedure. The internal shipment procedure is applied to all shipped configuration data or items. The recipient for shipment can only be changed by a controlled process. The packaging (if any) is part of the defined process and applied as agreed with the client. The forwarder supports the tracing of configuration data or items during internal shipment. For every sensitive configuration data or item, the protection measures against manipulation are defined (e.g. sealed boxes, encryption, integrity protection,).

O.External-Delivery: The recipient of a physical configuration item is identified by the assigned consumer address. The recipient(s) of an electronic configuration item (e.g. initialization data, response data) can be identified in different ways. The specific way is defined in the external delivery procedure. The external delivery procedure is applied to all sensitive configuration data or items. The recipient for shipment can only be changed by a controlled process. The packaging (if any) is also part of the defined process and applied as agreed with the client or the consumer. The forwarder supports the tracing of sensitive configuration data or items during external delivery. For every configuration data or item, the protection measures against manipulation are defined (if necessary).

O.Transfer-Data: Sensitive electronic configuration items (data or documents in electronic form) are protected by applying cryptographic algorithms to ensure confidentiality and/or integrity (whatever is required) during internal shipment and external delivery. In case asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are applied, the associated cryptographic keys must be assigned to individuals to ensure that only authorised employees are able to extract the sensitive electronic configuration items. Alternatively, symmetric key or password based exchanges methods might be used (e.g. symmetric key encrypted files, password encrypted archives) which don't allow assignment of individuals. In the latter case it has to be ensured that only authorised users have access to the cryptographic keys or passwords. The cryptographic keys and/or passwords are exchanged based on secure measures and they are sufficiently protected.

O.Control-Scrap: The site has measures in place to destroy sensitive documentation and erase electronic media. The site has measures in place to securely destroy Smart Card Modules or Smart Cards which use Smart Card chips. Smart Card Modules or Smart Cards which use Smart Card chips and that should be destroyed are securely destroyed or sent to another site for destruction or to the client for destruction so that they don't support an attacker.

5.1 Security Objectives Rationale

The SST includes a tracing which shows how the threats and OSPs for a development site are covered by the Security Objectives.

5.1.1 Mapping of Security Objectives

Threat and OSP	Security Objective	Note
T.Smart-Theft	O.Security-Documentation O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor	The combination of structural, technical and organisational measures detects unauthorised access and allow for appropriate response on any threat.

	O.Maintain-Security	
T.Rugged-Theft	O.Security-Documentation O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security	The combination of structural, technical and organisational measures detects unauthorised access and allow for appropriate response on any threat.
T.Computer-Net	O.Security-Documentation O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Logical-Access O.Logical-Operation O.Staff-Engagement	The technical and organisational measures prevent unauthorised access to the internal network.
T.Accident-Change	O.Config-Items O.Accept-Product O.Config-Control O.Config-Process	The automated measures and the control and verification procedures avoid accidental changes of sensitive items.
T.Unauthorised-Staff	O.Security-Documentation O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Internal-Monitor O.Maintain-Security O.Logical-Access O.Logical-Operation O.Staff-Engagement O.Zero-Balance	Physical and logical access control limits the access to sensitive data to authorised persons. In addition, organisational measures prevent uncontrolled access to products or product related items.
T.Staff-Collusion	O.Security-Documentation O.Internal-Monitor	The application of internal security measures combined with the hiring policies that

	O.Maintain-Security O.Staff-Engagement O.Transfer-Data O.Control-Scrap	restrict hiring to trustworthy employees prevent unauthorised access to sensitive data or items.
T.Attack-Transport	O.Internal-Shipment O.External-Delivery O.Transfer-Data	The applied security measures on sensitive data during internal shipment and external delivery prevent modification or disclosure of any sensitive data during transport. The applied security measures on physical items during internal shipment and external delivery allow detection of attempted attacks.
P.Config-Items	O.Reception-Control O.Config-Items	All relevant items are covered by the control.
P.Config-Control	O.Config-Items O.Config-Control O.Logical-Access O.Reception-Control	The scope of the configuration control comprises the production process.
P.Config-Process	O.Config-Process	The scope comprises the production process.
P.Reception-Control	O.Reception-Control	The incoming control on physical items ensures that only authentic items of correct quantity are accepted. The incoming control on electronic items ensures that only authentic items are accepted.
P.Accept-Product	O.Accept-Product O.Config-Process	On request of the client release tests are performed.

	O.Config-Control	
P.Zero-Balance	O.Zero-Balance O.Control-Scrap	The handling of correct and defective products ensure that no unexpected missing items or left-over items occur.
P.Organise-Product	O.Logical-Operation O.Logical-Access O.Config-Control O.Config-Process O.Organise-Product	The application of the production processes is ensured by O.Organise-Product supported by technical and organisational means.
P.Product-Transport	O.Config-Items O.Internal-Shipment O.External-Delivery O.Transfer-Data	The controlled shipment and delivery procedures ensure correct shipment and delivery of items.

Table 1: Security problem definition to security objectives mapping

6. Extended Assurance Components

Definition

No extended components are defined in this Site Security Target.

7. Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for this Site Security Target shall support an evaluation according to the assurance level EAL4+ and EAL5+ (AVA_VAN.5). In some cases, this evaluation assurance level is augmented by the security assurance requirement ALC_DVS.2. Therefore this security assurance requirement is also used in this Site Security Target instead of ALC_DVS.1 as defined for the package EAL4 and EAL5 in [2]. Because ALC_DVS.2 is the hierarchically higher component to ALC_DVS.1 this Site Security Target is also suitable for EAL4 and EAL5 evaluations using ALC_DVS.1.

The assurance requirements for the Life-Cycle support are:

ALC_CMC.4 (CM capabilities)

ALC_CMS.5 (CM scope)

ALC_DEL.1 (Delivery)

ALC_DVS.2 (Development security)

ALC_LCD.1 (Life-cycle definition)

The assurance requirements listed above fulfil the requirements of [4] because hierarchically higher components are used in this Site Security Target compared to the Minimum Requirements in [4]. In addition, the minimum set of assurance requirements is extended by assurance requirements of the assurance component for delivery (ALC_DEL.1).

The dependencies for the assurance requirements named above are as follows:

ALC_CMC.4: ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1

ALC_CMS.5: None

ALC_DEL.1: None

ALC_DVS.2: None

ALC_LCD.1: None

The following dependencies are not fulfilled or not completely fulfilled:

ALC_LCD.1: ALC_LCD.1 is part of this Site Security Target but doesn't cover product specific information of the life-cycle definition.

7.1 Application Notes and Refinements

The description of the site certification process [4] includes specific application notes. The main item is that a product that is considered as 'intended TOE' is not available during the evaluation. Since the term "TOE" is not applicable in the SST the associated processes for the handling of products are in the focus and described in this SST. These processes are subject of the evaluation of the site.

Refinements regarding Security Assurance Requirements as defined in CC Part 3 [2] are written in *italic*. The term 'TOE' is replaced by 'product' or 'configuration item'.

7.1.1 Overview regarding CM capabilities (ALC_CMC)

All Smart Card based products that can be completed and initialised at GDCHINA HS are defined in the CM tool SAP. Each product is defined as a combination of materials which are also defined in SAP. Each material and each product can be uniquely identified in the SAP system. The single production steps are controlled via the SAP system (e.g. if the first step is not marked as completed in SAP, the second step cannot be started)..

7.1.2 Overview regarding CM scope (ALC_CMS)

The configuration list contains all evaluation documentation for the certification of this site as well as the development tools used for production.

7.1.3 Overview regarding Delivery procedure (ALC_DEL)

The delivery aspect refers to the delivery of Smart Card ICs, Smart Card Modules, Inlays, Smart Cards and related data and documentation to the Smart Card Production site as well as all deliveries of Smart Card related products, related data and documentation

from the Smart Card Production site to the consumer, client (i.e. the Card Issuer) or other Smart Card Production facilities.

7.1.4 Overview regarding Development Security (ALC_DVS)

The site must ensure that the handling and storage of Smart Card related products is secure so that no information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase and no unauthorised modifications of security relevant parameters is possible. The confidentiality and integrity of configuration data and initialisation data must be guaranteed, access to any kind of Smart Card related products and related data and documentation must be restricted to authorised persons only.

Based on these requirements the physical security as well as the logical security of the site are in the focus of the evaluation. Beside the pure implementation of the security measures also the control and the maintenance of the security measures must be considered.

In addition, internal shipment within the Smart Card Production site has to be covered by ALC_DVS.

7.1.5 Overview regarding Life-cycle definition (ALC_LCD)

The Life Cycle Phase covered by GDCHINA HS is the 'Preparation Phase' in the sense of the Common Criteria. G+D uses a quality management system and is certified according to ISO9001.

7.1.6 Security Assurance Rationale

The security assurance requirements rationale maps the content elements of the selected assurance components of [2] to the security objectives defined in this Site Security Target. The refinements described above are considered.

The site has a process in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent identification of the products.

Note: The content elements that are changed from the original CEM [3] according to the application notes in the process description [4] are written in *italic*. The term TOE can be replaced by configuration items or product.

7.1.7 Rationale for ALC_CMC.4

Security Assurance Requirement	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_CMC.4.1C: <i>The CM documentation shall show that a process is in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent labelling.</i>	O.Reception-Control O.Config-Items	Upon reception of an item from another site O.Reception-Control ensures that authenticity is verified for the shipped item. With this it is ensured that the item has been labeled before delivery. After integration into the CM system O.Config-Items ensures appropriate and consistent labelling as well as unique identification of the item.
ALC_CMC.4.2C: The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.	O.Config-Items	see ALC_CMC.4.1C
ALC_CMC.4.3C: The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.	O.Config-Items	see ALC_CMC.4.1C
ALC_CMC.4.4C: The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items.	O.Config-Control O.Logical-Access	All configuration items are kept under configuration control according to O.Config-Control. O.Config-Control is supported by O.Logical-Access that requires the authentication of each user before any change can be

		applied to a configuration item.
ALC_CMC.4.5C: The CM system shall support the production of the <i>product</i> by automated means.	O.Config-Process	The ERP system supports automated production of products.
ALC_CMC.4.6C: The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.	O.Config-Process	CM process documentation is available and maintained according to O.Config-Process.
ALC_CMC.4.7C: The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the <i>product</i> .	O.Config-Process	CM process documentation is available and maintained according to O.Config-Process.
ALC_CMC.4.8C: The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items (as part of the <i>product</i>).	O.Config-Control O.Config-Process	Process descriptions are covered by O.Config-Process, including modification or new generation of configuration items. Handling of change management for released products is covered by O.Config-Control.
ALC_CMC.4.9C: The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.	O.Config-Items O.Config-Control	All configuration items are kept under configuration control according to O.Config-Items and O.Config-Control.
ALC_CMC.4.10C: The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM	O.Config-Process	The operation of the CM system in accordance to the CM plan is ensured by

system is being operated in accordance with the CM plan.		O.Config-Process.
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Table 2: Rationale for ALC_CMC.4

7.1.8 Rationale for ALC_CMS.5

Security Assurance Requirement	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_CMS.5.1C: The configuration list shall include the following: <i>clear instructions how to consider these items in the list; the evaluation evidence required by the SARs of the life-cycle; security flaw reports and resolution status; development and production tools and related information.</i>	O.Config-Items O.Config-Process	The unique identification of all configuration items is ensured by O.Config-Items. O.Config-Process contains the CM documentation including clear instructions how to consider the configuration items in the configuration list.
ALC_CMS.5.2C: The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.	O.Config-Items O.Config-Process	The unique identification of all configuration items is ensured by O.Config-Items. O.Config-Process contains the CM documentation.
ALC_CMS.5.3C: <i>Requires a process ensuring that subcontractors involved in developing configuration items are listed in the configuration list.</i>	O.Config-Process	O.Config-Process contains the CM documentation including clear instructions how to consider the configuration items in the configuration list (no subcontractors are used).

Table 3: Rationale for ALC_CMS.5

7.1.9 Rationale for ALC_DVS.2

Security Assurance Requirement	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_DVS.2.1C: The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the <i>product</i> design and implementation in its development environment.	O.Security-Documentation O.Physical-Access O.Security-Control O.Alarm-Response O.Logical-Access O.Logical-Operation O.Staff-Engagement O.Zero-Balance O.Maintain-Security O.Internal-Shipment O.Transfer-Data O.Control-Scrap	The development security documentation from O.Security-Documentation describes all physical measures according to O.Physical-Access supported by O.Security-Control and O.Alarm-Response. In addition, all logical measures are described according to O.Logical-Access and O.Logical-Operation. These measures are supported by the security awareness of the staff according to O.Staff-Engagement and the measures that ensure the functionality of the technical security measures of the site according to O.Maintain-Security. Security during internal shipment is ensured by O.Internal-Shipment and O.Transfer-Data. O.Control-Scrap and O.Zero-Balance ensure that no unauthorised access to products is possible for an attacker.
ALC_DVS.2.2C: The development security	O. Security-Documentation	The security measures of the site are in agreement with the

documentation shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the <i>product</i> or <i>at least are followed during the development and maintenance of the product</i> .	O.Internal-Monitor O.Internal-Shipment O.Transfer-Data	security documentation of O.Security-Documentation. Sufficiency of the security measures is verified according to O.Internal-Monitor. Security during internal shipment is ensured by O.Internal-Shipment and O.Transfer-Data.
ALC_DVS.2.3C: <i>The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product.</i>	O. Security-Documentation O.Internal-Monitor	The security measures of the site are in agreement with the security documentation and their evidences of O.Security-Documentation. Sufficiency of the security measures and the evidences is verified according to O.Internal-Monitor.

Table 4: Rationale for ALC_DVS.2

7.1.10 Rationale for ALC_DEL.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_DEL.1.1C: The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the <i>product</i> to the consumer.	O.External-Delivery O.Transfer-Data	All external deliveries are according to O.External-Delivery and O.Transfer-Data.

Table 5: Rationale for ALC_DEL.1

7.1.11 Rationale for ALC_LCD.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Security Objective	Rationale
ALC_LCD.1.1C: The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the <i>product</i> .	O.Config-Control O.Config-Process O.Accept-Product O.Organise-Product	During production no development takes place. Therefore only the maintenance of products is relevant for this site. Maintenance is done according to O.Config-Control, O.Config-Process and O.Organise-Product. On request of the customer, release tests are performed according to O.Accept-Product.
ALC_LCD.1.2C: The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the <i>product</i> .	O.Config-Control O.Config-Process O.Accept-Product O.Organise-Product	see ALC_LCD.1.1C

Table 6: Rationale for ALC_LCD.1

The guidance on Site Certification [4], chap. 4.8 requires that this rationale shows that all security objectives are effectively addressed by the SARs. The results are summarised in the following table.

Security Objective	Security Assurance Requirements
O.Security-Documentation	ALC_DVS.2.1C, ALC_DVS.2.2C, ALC_DVS.2.3C
O.Physical-Access	ALC_DVS.2.1C
O.Security-Control	ALC_DVS.2.1C

O.Alarm-Response	ALC_DVS.2.1C
O.Internal-Monitor	ALC_DVS.2.2C, ALC_DVS.2.3C
O.Maintain-Security	ALC_DVS.2.1C
O.Logical-Access	ALC_CMC.4.4C, ALC_DVS.2.1C
O.Logical-Operation	ALC_DVS.2.1C
O.Config-Items	ALC_CMC.4.1C, ALC_CMC.4.2C, ALC_CMC.4.3C, ALC_CMC.4.9C, ALC_CMS.5.1C, ALC_CMS.5.2C
O.Config-Control	ALC_CMC.4.4C, ALC_CMC.4.8C, ALC_CMC.4.9C, ALC_LCD.1.1C, ALC_LCD.1.2C
O.Config-Process	ALC_CMC.4.5C, ALC_CMC.4.6C, ALC_CMC.4.7C, ALC_CMC.4.8C, ALC_CMC.4.10C, ALC_CMS.5.1C, ALC_CMS.5.2C, ALC_CMS.5.3C, ALC_LCD.1.1C, ALC_LCD.1.2C
O.Accept-Product	ALC_LCD.1.1C, ALC_LCD.1.2C
O.Organise-Product	ALC_LCD.1.1C, ALC_LCD.1.2C,
O.Staff-Engagement	ALC_DVS.2.1C
O.Zero-Balance	ALC_DVS.2.1C
O.Reception-Control	ALC_CMC.4.1C
O.Internal-Shipment	ALC_DVS.2.1C, ALC_DVS.2.2C
O.External-Delivery	ALC_DEL.1.1C
O.Transfer-Data	ALC_DVS.2.1C, ALC_DVS.2.2C, ALC_DEL.1.1C
O.Control-Scrap	ALC_DVS.2.1C

Table 7: Rationale for Security Objectives

8. Site Summary Specification

8.1 Preconditions required by the site

This section provides background information on the assumptions defined in chap. 4.4.

The client must provide appropriate information for the secure production of ordered products. The client is responsible for the release of the products (e.g. by buying released products). The client provides a method of unique identification for all items shipped to the site. The client provides appropriate information for the delivery of produced goods as well as electronic data to be delivered. This information shall at least comprise address data for physical items.

The self-protection features of the Smart Cards to be produced are fully operational during production.

Scrap parts are either destroyed under supervision of the site or delivered to the client or another production site for secure destruction. In the latter case, the client or the other production site is responsible for the secure destruction of scrap parts.

Details on the requirements for the secure exchange of physical and electronic items are summarised in the confidential document 'Confidential_Preconditions_GDCHINA HS.doc'.

If services provided by other G+D sites related to production and development of products which undergo Common Criteria certification are used then these sites are CC certified.²

8.2 Services of the site

This site provides the service of secure reception, storage and delivery of Smart Card ICs, Smart Card modules and Smart Cards and related goods, secure reception and storage of data for Smart Card Production as well as secure destruction of Smart Card modules and Smart Cards.

The reception of Smart Card ICs, Smart Card modules and Smart Cards comprises a verification of the correctness of the delivered items with respect to the delivery

² As mentioned in sec. 2.2.2, GDCHINA HS uses services from GDM, which is part of the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0185-2021.

documents and - if applicable - the verification of integrity of seals used for secure transportation of items.

The storage of Smart Card related items is done in a specially secured environment on G+D premises with restricted access. The number of items is tracked from reception of the items until the delivery of the items.

In addition, this sites provides the service of inlay production, completion and initialisation of Smart Card Products based on G+D's STARCOS operating system or G+D's Smart Cafe Expert operating system as well as additional services for them which are out of scope for this Site Security Target (e.g. personalisation services). Performing the initialisation is an optional production step.

Secure destruction of Smart Card modules (either several single modules from reel or modules formally part of a Smart Card) with a shredder and additional grinding to a maximum size of 1 mm² (DIN 66399 E-6) or the plastic card body of a Smart Card (without module) with a shredder.

8.3 Objectives rationale

The following rationale provides a justification that shows that all threats and organisational security policies are effectively addressed by the security objectives.

The following table shows which security objectives cover which threats and OSPs.

Security Objective	Threats and OSPs
O.Security-Documentation	T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion
O.Physical-Access	T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Unauthorised-Staff
O.Security-Control	T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Unauthorised-Staff
O.Alarm-Response	T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Unauthorised-Staff
O.Internal-Monitor	T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion
O.Maintain-Security	T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion
O.Logical-Access	T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, P.Config-Control, P.Organise-Product
O.Logical-Operation	T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, P.Organise-

	Product
O.Config-Items	T.Accident-Change, P.Config-Items, P.Config-Control, P.Product-Transport
O.Config-Control	T.Accident-Change, P.Organise-Product, P.Config-Control
O.Config-Process	T.Accident-Change, P.Config-Process, P.Organise-Product
O.Accept-Product	T.Accident-Change, P.Accept-Product
O.Organise-Product	P.Organise-Product
O.Staff-Engagement	T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion
O.Zero-Balance	P.Zero-Balance, T.Unauthorised-Staff
O.Reception-Control	P.Config-Items, P.Reception-Control
O.Internal-Shipment	T.Attack-Transport, P.Product-Transport
O.External-Delivery	T.Attack-Transport, P.Product-Transport
O.Transfer-Data	T.Staff-Collusion, T.Attack-Transport, P.Product-Transport
O.Control-Scrap	T.Staff-Collusion, P.Zero-Balance

Table 8: Relation between Security Objectives and Threats and OSPs

O.Security-Documentation

The security of the site is maintained according to the sites security documentation covering all physical and logical measures to ensure the security of the site.

These security measures are necessary to prevent the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff and T.Staff-Collusion.

O.Physical-Access

The production site is operated by G+D only and is not shared with other companies. The site is separated into different security levels. The production site is monitored by security staff on duty and surveillance cameras at all times.

The building can only be entered presenting a company badge or visitor's badge to the card readers at the only main entrance (turnstyles) . All employees and visitors have to wear their badges visible at any time.

The access to the production area is secured by mantraps with card readers. Access to the production area requires special permissions.

All other measures are internal to the site and are therefore not provided in the lite version of the SST.

These measures prevent access to sensitive areas for any unauthorised person and therefore prevent the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Unauthorised-Staff.

O.Security-Control

Trained security staff is in charge of operating all security related systems. This especially holds granting access rights, etc. Visitors are escorted by the company's security staff or collected by company internal staff from the company's security staff.

Therefore the threats T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft and T.Unauthorised-Staff are addressed by management of the security related systems like the access control system.

O.Alarm-Response

Several alarm and detection sensors are installed to provide a warning system for entering the premises by T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft and T.Unauthorised-Staff. Security staff will start to investigate any alarm immediately.

O.Internal-Monitor

The security officer performs meetings with all security staff on a regular basis. During this meeting security procedures are reviewed and corrective actions are initiated (if necessary). In case security related incident occurred since the last security meeting,

they will be addressed. In addition, internal audits are performed on a regular basis to ensure the application of the security measures.

The monitoring and protection of the IT system (including network) is handled by the IT departments under supervision of the IT security manager of the company's security staff.

These measures prevent T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion.

O.Maintain-Security

All security related alarm and detection systems are checked on a regular basis. Logs for building access or site access as well as access to especially secured areas are stored and checked on a regular basis. Network security is monitored permanently by the IT-department.

These measures prevent T.Smart-Theft, T.Rugged-Theft, T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff, T.Staff-Collusion.

O.Logical-Access

The IT network is logically separated from the outside world by a firewall system consisting of several firewalls which ensures that only authorised connections from and to the IT network are possible. At least two firewalls (i.e. outer firewall and inner firewall) are present between the outside world and any internal network.

Each user has an individual account. To access data on the company's network every user has to authenticate himself either by login name and password or token and password. Multiple successive failed authentication attempts lead to a blocked the account. The number of retries depend on the authentication method.

Access rights to all network resources are set according to a need-to-know or need-to-have basis, respectively. Access rights of users who do not need access to a network

share any longer (e.g. change of jobs) are revoked. In particular, all accounts of employees who leave the company are deactivated.

The production network is additionally separated from the rest of G+D's internal network.

These measures prevent T.Computer-Net and T.Unauthorised-Staff and support the OSPs P.Config-Control and P.Organise-Product.

O.Logical-Operation

Virus protection and patch management for operating systems and applications shall ensure the correct operation of the systems and prevent the systems from malfunction. They ensure that protective measures of the IT workplaces are up-to-date (virus definitions, security patches of operating system, security patches of programs, etc.). In addition, regular backups are applied to prevent loss of data. Backup tapes are securely stored protected against unauthorised modification and disclosure.

These measures prevent T.Computer-Net and T.Unauthorised-Staff and support the OSP P.Organise-Product.

O.Config-Items

All configuration items are identified by a unique version number by the configuration management system. By this different products can be identified. By this the threat T.Accident-Change is countered and the OSPs P.Config-Items, P.Config-Control and P.Product-Transport are addressed.

O.Config-Control

The application of released procedures for the setup of the production process for each product and the controlled introduction of changes ensures a production according to clients' specifications. Procedures for setting up the production process as well as changes to the initial setup are done only by authorised personnel. The production process is supported by automated systems. By this the OSPs P.Organise-Product and P.Config-Control are addressed. In addition, the threat T.Accident-Change is covered.

O.Config-Process

Configuration items are stored in the configuration management system according to the site's configuration management plan. By this the OSPs P.Config-Process and P.Organise-Product are addressed.

O.Accept-Product

On request of the client release tests are performed for the corresponding products. By this the threat T.Accident-Change is countered and the OSP P.Accept-Product is addressed. The management of flaws and optimisations of the process flow defined by O.Config-Process encounters the threat T.Accident-Change.

O.Organise-Product

The development processes are defined and applied according to the site's quality management system. By this the OSP P.Organise-Product is addressed.

O.Staff-Engagement

All employees working at the site and having access to sensitive information or data have to sign a non-disclosure agreement to provide legal liability to protect sensitive information against disclosure. In addition, all employees are trained regarding security to support the security awareness. All employees have to pass a security check before they are hired. These measures prevent T.Computer-Net, T.Unauthorised-Staff and T.Staff-Collusion.

O.Zero-Balance

Automated means and/or the application of a 4-eyes-principle ensures a continuous tracking of Smart Cards or Smart Card Modules during the whole production process. By this the OSP P.Zero-Balance is addressed.

O.Reception-Control

Upon reception of an electronic item relevant to security from a different site, authenticity of this item is verified (e.g. verification of a PGP signature when sent via email).

Identification is performed if necessary (i.e. requested by the client; the client has to provide information how to identify the item). In case items are shared by a shared configuration management system between different sites or shared network drives, authenticity is implicitly assumed. By this the OSPs P.Config-Items and P.Reception-Control are addressed.

O.Internal-Shipment

Security relevant physical items are internally shipped either by security transport (e.g. sealed boxes) or in person by company's internal staff. Security relevant electronic items are internally shipped using secure communication measures. This might be signed and/or encrypted emails or similar (e.g. SSL secured webportals) or shared network systems (e.g. shared configuration management system). This prevents T.Attack-Transport and covers also P.Product-Transport.

O.External-Delivery

Security relevant physical items are externally delivered either by security transport (e.g. sealed boxes), in person by company's internal staff or collected by the client or the consumer as long as the security functions of the item are not sufficient to protect itself. Security relevant electronic items are externally shipped using secure communication measures. This might be signed and/or encrypted emails or similar (e.g. SSL secured webportals). This prevents T.Attack-Transport and covers also P.Product-Transport.

O.Transfer-Data

Sensitive electronic configuration items are protected against modification and/or disclosure by cryptographic means during transfer. Either symmetric means, asymmetric means or password protection are applied (as appropriate). Cryptographic keys and password used for secure communication are sufficiently protected against unauthorised

access and disclosure. This prevents T.Staff-Collusion, T.Attack-Transport and covers also P.Product-Transport.

O.Control-Scrap

Scrap is either destroyed under supervision of the site, securely transferred to another site of Giesecke+Devrient capable of secure destruction of scrap or securely shipped to a different site for destruction. By this no employee could get uncontrolled access to scrap which might be helpful to support an attack. This prevents T.Staff-Collusion and covers P.Zero-Balance.

8.4 SAR Rationale

The Security Assurance Requirements rationale does not explicitly address the developer action elements defined in [2] because they are implicitly included in the content elements. This comprises the provision of the documentation to support the evaluation and the preparation for the site visit. In addition, this includes that the procedures are applied as written and explained in the documentation.

8.4.1 ALC_CMC

ALC_CMC.4.1C: *The CM documentation shall show that a process is in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent labeling* (refined for Site Certification).

ALC_CMC.4.2C: The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.

ALC_CMC.4.3C: The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.

ALC_CMC.4.4C: The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items.

ALC_CMC.4.5C: The CM system shall support the production of the *product* by automated means.

ALC_CMC.4.6C: The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.

ALC_CMC.4.7C: The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the *product*.

ALC_CMC.4.8C: The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the *product*.

ALC_CMC.4.9C: The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.

ALC_CMC.4.10C: The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in accordance with the CM plan.

The security assurance requirements of the assurance class "CM capabilities" listed above are suitable to support the production of high volumes due to the automated support. The identification of all configuration items allows a parallel production of several products. The requirement for authorized changes support the integrity and confidentiality required for the products. Therefore this assurance level meets the requirements for the configuration management.

8.4.2 ALC_CMS

ALC_CMS.5.1C: The configuration list shall include the following: *clear instructions how to consider these items in the list*; the evaluation evidence required by the SARs of the *life-cycle*; security flaw reports and resolution status; *development and production tools and related information*.

ALC_CMS.5.2C: The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

ALC_CMS.5.3C: *Requires a process ensuring that subcontractors involved in developing configuration items are listed in the configuration list.*

8.4.3 ALC_DVS

ALC_DVS.2.1C: The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the *product* design and implementation in its development environment.

ALC_DVS.2.2C: The development security documentation shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the *product* or at least are followed during the development and maintenance of the *product*.

ALC_DVS.2.3C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the *product*.

The security assurance requirements of the assurance class "Development security" listed above are required since a high attack potential is assumed for potential attackers. The information used at the site during the production and initialization of the product can be used by potential attackers during the development of attacks. Based on the assumed self protection of the products the information is needed to apply an attack within considerable time and effort. The keys used during the initialization process also support the security during the shipment or delivery. Therefore the handling is applied to split keys and a special storage of electronic keys is implemented.

8.4.4 ALC_LCD

ALC_LCD.1.1C: The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the *product*.

ALC_LCD.1.2C: The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the *product*.

The security assurance requirements of the assurance class "Life-cycle definition" listed above are suitable to support the controlled production maintenance and development process. This includes the documentation of these processes and the procedures for the configuration management. The site supports only one phase of the described life cycle for the category of products. However the assurance requirements are considered to be suitable for this site.

8.4.5 ALC_DEL

ALC_DEL.1.1C: The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the *product* to the consumer.

The security assurance requirement of the assurance class " Delivery" listed above is suitable to define a controlled environment and controlled processes for shipping procedures. The confidentiality and integrity of the product is addressed by this assurance class.

8.5 Assurance Measures Rationale

O.Security-Documentation

ALC_DVS.2.1C, requires that the developer shall have a security documentation and ALC_DVS2.2C requires the justification that the described measures are appropriate to provide the necessary level of protection. Therefore this objective contributes to meet the Security Assurance Requirements.

ALC_DVS.2.3C: *The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product.*

O.Physical-Access

ALC_DVS.2.1C requires that the developer shall describe all physical security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and implementation in its development environment. Thereby this objective contributes to meet the Security Assurance Requirement.

O.Security-Control

ALC_DVS.2.1C requires that the developer shall describe all personnel, procedural and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and implementation including the initialization in its development and production environment. Thereby this objective contributes to meet the Security Assurance Requirement.

O.Alarm-Response

ALC_DVS.2.1C requires that the developer shall describe all personnel, procedural and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and in its development environment. Thereby this objective contributes to meet the Security Assurance Requirement.

O.Internal-Monitor

ALC_DVS.2.2C: The development security documentation shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the *product or at least are followed during the development and maintenance of the product*. Thereby this objective contributes to meet the Security Assurance Requirement.

ALC_DVS.2.3C: *The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product.*

O.Maintain-Security

ALC_DVS.2.1C: The development security documentation shall describe the security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and implementation in its development environment. Thereby this objective contributes to meet the Security Assurance Requirement.

O.Logical-Access

ALC_DVS.2.1C requires that the developer shall describe all personnel, procedural and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and implementation including the initialization in its development and production environment. ALC_CMC.4.4C requires that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items. Thereby this objective is suitable to meet the Security Assurance Requirements.

O.Logical-Operation

ALC_DVS.2.1C: The development security documentation shall describe the security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and implementation in its development environment. Thereby this objective is suitable to meet the Security Assurance Requirement.

O.Config-Items

ALC_CMC.4.1C requires a documented process ensuring an appropriate and consistent labelling of the products and ALC_CMC.4.2C requires a methodology description. In addition, ALC_CMC.4.3C requires that the CM system uniquely identifies all configuration items. ALC_CMC.4.9C requires that the evidence demonstrates that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system. The configuration list required by ALC_CMS.5.1C shall include the evaluation evidence for the fulfilment of the SARs of the life-cycle, development and production tools. ALC_CMS.5.2C requires that all configuration items are identified uniquely. The objective meets the set of Security Assurance Requirements.

O.Config-Control

ALC_CMC.4.4C and ALC_CMC.4.8C requires that the CM system provides automated measures that only authorised changes are made. A controlled setup is necessary to ensure that the resulting products are compliant with the customers' specifications which supports the maintenance of products according to ALC_CMC.4.9C, ALC_LCD.1.1C and ALC_LCD.1.2C.

O.Config-Process

The provision of automated measures is required by ALC_CMC.4.5C. ALC_CMC.4.6C requires that the CM documentation includes a CM plan. ALC_CMC.4.7C requires that the CM plan describes how the CM system is used for the development of the product. ALC_CMC.4.8C requires the description of the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the product. ALC_CMC.4.10C requires that the evidence demonstrates that the CM system is being operated in accordance with the

CM plan. The configuration list required by ALC_CMS.5.1C shall include the evaluation evidence for the fulfilment of the SARs of the life-cycle, security flaw reports and resolution status, development and production tools and related information.

ALC_CMS.5.2C requires that all configuration items are identified uniquely.

ALC_CMS.5.3C requires a process ensuring that subcontractors involved in developing configuration items are listed in the configuration list.

ALC_LCD1.1C requires a description of the model used to develop and maintain the product. ALC_LCD.1.2C requires that the life-cycle model provides the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the product. The objective meets the set of Security Assurance Requirements.

O.Organise-Product

ALC_LCD1.1C requires a description of the model used to develop and maintain the product. ALC_LCD.1.2C requires that the life-cycle model provides the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the product.

Thereby the objective fulfils this combination of Security Assurance Requirements.

O.Staff-Engagement

ALC_DVS.2.1C requires the description of personnel security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and implementation in its development environment. Thereby the objective fulfils this combination of Security Assurance Requirements.

O.Zero-Balance

Ensuring that no unidentified losses of Smart Cards and Smart Card Modules can occur, prevents an attacker from getting access to samples of products to investigate potential vulnerabilities. This is necessary to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of products as required by ALC_DVS.2.1C.

O.Reception-Control

ALC_CMC.4.1C requires that the CM documentation shall show that a process is in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent labeling. Newly created configuration items are also items that are received by another development site which have to be integrated into the site's CM system. Thereby this objective is suitable to meet this Security Assurance Requirement.

O.Internal-Shipment

ALC_DVS.2.1C requires that the development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and implementation in its development environment. ALC_DVS2.2C requires the justification that the described measures are appropriate to provide the necessary level of protection. This protection also includes internal shipments. Thereby the objective is suitable to meet this combination of Security Assurance Requirements.

O.External-Delivery

ALC_DEL.1.1C: The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the product to the consumer. Thereby this objective is suitable to meet the Security Assurance Requirement.

O.Transfer-Data

ALC_DVS.2.1C: The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the product design and implementation in its development environment. ALC_DVS2.2C requires the justification that the described measures are appropriate to provide the necessary level of protection. This protection also includes internal shipments. ALC_DEL.1.1C requires that the delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the product to the consumer (external delivery). Thereby this objective is suitable to meet the combination of Security Assurance Requirements.

O.Control-Scrap

The controlled destruction of scrap is necessary to ensure the confidentiality of products as required by ALC_DVS.2.1C.

O.Accept-Product

In ALC_LCD.1.1C and in ALC_LCD.1.2C it is requested that the life-cycle documentation and the life-cycle model supports the correct development and maintenance of the product. Thereby the objective is suitable to meet this combination of Security Assurance Requirements.

8.6 Mapping of the Evaluation Documentation

8.6.1 Mapping for ALC_CMC.4

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
ALC_CMC.4.1C: <i>The CM documentation shall show that a process is in place to ensure an appropriate and consistent labelling.</i>	all	[6], chap. 2.1
ALC_CMC.4.2C: The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.	all	[6], chap. 2.1
ALC_CMC.4.3C: The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.	all	[6], chap. 2.1

ALC_CMC.4.4C: The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items.	all	[6], chap. 2.1, chap. 3.2
ALC_CMC.4.5C: The CM system shall support the production of the <i>product</i> by automated means.	all	[6], chap. 2.1.4
ALC_CMC.4.6C: The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.	all	[6], chap. 3
ALC_CMC.4.7C: The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the <i>product</i> .	all	[6], chap. 3
ALC_CMC.4.8C: The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items (as part of the <i>product</i>).	all	[6], chap. 3.2
ALC_CMC.4.9C: The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.	all	This is usually verified for a specific product. For this only examples could be provided.
ALC_CMC.4.10C: The evidence shall	all	This is usually verified for a specific product. For this only

demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in accordance with the CM plan.		examples could be provided.
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Table 9: Mapping for ALC_CMC.4

8.6.2 Mapping for ALC_CMS.5

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
ALC_CMS.5.1C: The configuration list shall include the following: <i>clear instructions how to consider these items in the list</i> ; the evaluation evidence required by the SARs of <i>the life-cycle</i> ; security flaw reports and resolution status, <i>development and production tools and related information</i> .	all	This is usually verified for a specific product. For this only examples could be provided.
ALC_CMS.5.2C: The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.	all	This is usually verified for a specific product. For this only examples could be provided.
ALC_CMS.5.3C: <i>Requires a process ensuring that subcontractors involved in developing configuration items are listed in the configuration list.</i>	all	This is usually verified for a specific product. For this only examples could be provided.

Table 10: Mapping for ALC_CMS.5

8.6.3 Mapping for ALC_DVS.2

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
ALC_DVS.2.1C: The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the <i>product</i> design and implementation in its development environment.	Physical Security	[8], chap. 4.1
ALC_DVS.2.1C	Personnel Security	[8], chap. 4.2
ALC_DVS.2.1C	Logical Security, IT-Security	[8], chap. 4.3
ALC_DVS.2.1C	Security of Production Process	[8], chap. 3
ALC_DVS.2.2C: The development security documentation shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the <i>product or at least are followed</i>	all	[8], chap. 5

during the development and maintenance of the product.		
ALC_DVS.2.3C: The evidence shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product.	all	[8], chap. 5

Table 11: Mapping for ALC_DVS.2

8.6.4 Mapping for ALC_DEL.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
ALC_DEL.1.1C: The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the <i>product</i> to the consumer.	all	[7], chap. 2

Table 12: Mapping for ALC_DEL.1

8.6.5 Mapping for ALC_LCD.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
ALC_LCD.1.1C: The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain		[9], whole document

the <i>product</i> .		
ALC_LCD.1.2C: The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the <i>product</i> .		[9], whole document

Table 13: Mapping for ALC_LCD.1

8.6.6 Mapping for AST_INT.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
AST_INT.1.1C: The SST introduction shall contain an SST reference, a Site reference and a Site description.	SST introduction	This document, chapter 1 and 2
AST_INT.1.2C: The SST reference shall uniquely identify the SST.	SST introduction	This document, chapter 1
AST_INT.1.3C The Site reference shall identify the Site.	SST introduction	This document, chapter 2
AST_INT.1.4C The Site description shall describe the physical scope of the Site.	SST introduction	This document, chapter 2
AST_INT.1.5C The Site description shall describe the logical scope of the Site.	SST introduction	This document, chapter 2

Table 14: Mapping for AST_INT.1

8.6.7 Mapping for AST_CCL.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
AST_CCL.1.1C: The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the version of the CC to which the SST and the Site claim conformance.	Conformance claims	This document, chapter 3
AST_CCL.1.2C: The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the SST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.	Conformance claims	This document, chapter 3
AST_CCL.1.3C: The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components definition.	Conformance claims	This document, chapter 3
AST_CCL.1.4C: The CC conformance claim shall identify the SARs.	Conformance claims	This document, chapter 3

Table 15: Mapping for AST_CCL.1

8.6.8 Mapping for AST_SPD.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
AST_SPD.1.1C: The security problem	Security problem	This document, chapter 4

definition shall describe the threats.	definition	
AST_SPD.1.2C: All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an adverse action.	Security problem definition	This document, chapter 4
AST_SPD.1.3C: The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.	Security problem definition	This document, chapter 4

Table 16: Mapping for AST_SPD.1

8.6.9 Mapping for AST_OBJ.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
AST_OBJ.1.1C: The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for the development environment.	Security objectives	This document, chapter 5
AST_OBJ.1.2C: The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the development environment back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that security objective.	Security objectives	This document, chapter 5
AST_OBJ.1.3C: The	Security objectives	This document, chapter 5

security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives counter all threats.		
AST_OBJ.1.4C: The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives enforce all OSPs.	Security objectives	This document, chapter 5

Table 17: Mapping for AST_OBJ.1

8.6.10 Mapping for AST_ECD.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
AST_ECD.1.1C: The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security requirements.	Extended Components Definition	This document, chapter 6
AST_ECD.1.2C: The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each extended security requirement.	Extended Components Definition	This document, chapter 6
AST_ECD.1.3C: The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component is related to the existing CC components, families,	Extended Components Definition	This document, chapter 6

and classes.		
AST_ECD.1.4C: The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components, families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.	Extended Components Definition	This document, chapter 6
AST_ECD.1.5C: The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements such that compliance or noncompliance to these elements can be demonstrated.	Extended Components Definition	This document, chapter 6

Table 18: Mapping for AST_ECD.1

8.6.11 Mapping for AST_REQ.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
AST_REQ.1.1C: The statement of security requirements shall describe the SARs.	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7
AST_REQ.1.2C: The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security requirements.	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7
AST_REQ.1.3C: The	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7

statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security requirements.		
AST_REQ.1.4C: All operations shall be performed correctly.	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7
AST_REQ.1.5C: Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7
AST_REQ.1.6C: The statement of security requirements shall contain only SARs drawn from components in the ALC class.	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7
AST_REQ.1.7C: The statement of security requirements shall contain ALC_DVS.1, ALC_CMC.3 and ALC_CMS.1 or hierarchically higher SARs.	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7
AST_REQ.1.8C: The security requirements	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7

rationale shall trace each SAR back to the security objectives for the development environment.		
AST_REQ.1.9C: The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SARs meet all security objectives for the development environment.	Security requirements	This document, chapter 7

Table 19: Mapping for AST_REQ.1

8.6.12 Mapping for AST_SSS.1

Security Assurance Requirement	Aspects	References
AST_SSS.1.1C: The Site summary specification shall identify all evidence for the SARs.	Site summary specification	This document, chapter 8
AST_SSS.1.2C: The Site summary specification shall describe aspects of how the Site meets the SARs.	Site summary specification	This document, chapter 8
AST_SSS.1.3C: The Site summary specification shall trace the aspects to the evidence.	Site summary specification	This document, chapter 8

Table 20: Mapping for AST_SSS.1

9. References

9.1 Literature

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April 2017
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components; Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
- [3] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
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- [5] Site Security Target Template, Eurosmart, Version 1.0, 21.06.2009
- [6] Configuration Management Documentation for Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security China Huangshi Branch, Version 1.0, 16.07.2020
- [7] Delivery Documentation for Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security China Huangshi Branch, Version 1.0, 16.07.2020
- [8] Development Security Documentation for Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security China Huangshi Branch, Version 1.3, 09.05.2022
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- [10] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, 19.02.2014
- [11] Services provided by other G+D sites used by Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security China Huangshi Branch, Version 1.2, 25.02.2022

9.2 Terminology

client The word 'client' is used if the site operates as development site on request of another development site. The ordering development site is denoted as

'client'. The word client is used here instead of 'customer' , because the words 'customer' and 'consumer' are reserved in Common Criteria.

9.3 Abbreviations

CC	Common Criteria.
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level.
GDM	Giesecke+Devrient München.
IC	Integrated circuit.
IT	Information Technology.
SST	Site Security Target
ST	Security Target.
TOE	Target of Evaluation.
TSF	TOE Security functions.
TSP	TOE Security Policy.
CM	Configuration Management

